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Human metacognition involves discrimi-
nation, interpretation, and broadcasting
of subtle cues indicating the rightness of
ongoing thought and behaviour.
We propose that human metacognition
is made fit for purpose by cultural evolu-
tion rather than genetic evolution.
In particular, we present evidence that
the effective discrimination, interpreta-Cecilia Heyes,1,2,* Dan Bang,2,3 Nicholas Shea,4,5 Christopher D. Frith,3,4 and
Stephen M. Fleming3,6,7,*
Metacognition – the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing cognitive
processes – helps us perform many tasks, both when acting alone and when
working with others. While metacognition is adaptive, and found in other animals,
we should not assume that all human forms of metacognition are gene-based
adaptations. Instead, some forms may have a social origin, including the
discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations.
There is evidence that each of these abilities depends on cultural learning
and therefore that cultural selectionmight shape humanmetacognition. The cultural
origins hypothesis is a plausible and testable alternative that directs us towards a
substantial new programme of research.tion, and broadcasting of metacognitive
cues depends on cultural learning.
The cultural origins hypothesis advances
a programme of research on the devel-
opment of metacognition, cultural varia-
tion, individual differences, and cross-
species comparisons.
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(S.M. Fleming).Where Does Metacognition Come From?
How do cognitive mechanisms become fit for purpose? They are all complex products of nature
and nurture, but who or what designs the features that enable cognitive processes to do their
jobs? How come visual systems can see, learning mechanisms can learn, and reasoning
processes can reason?
In many cases, gene-based selection (see Glossary) leads the design team. The visual system
can see primarily because it has been honed by natural selection over biological generations.
Variant systems were genetically inherited, and, through differential reproduction, those that
were better at processing visual information proliferated while the others died out. In some
cases, intentional design is also involved [1]. The cognitive mechanisms enabling you to read
these words were designed in part by educationalists. The people who teach us to read, and
designers of literacy programmes, make new cognitive mechanisms from old parts. With
foresight and deliberation, they turn mechanisms that were designed by genetic evolution for
small object recognition into a cognitive system for reading [2].
For some cognitive mechanisms, cultural selection is a third member of the design team,
alongside genetic evolution and intentional design. Recent evidence suggests that a range of
cognitive mechanisms, including imitation and mindreading (or theory of mind), have been
shaped by a cultural selection process analogous to gene-based selection [3–7]. In this cultural
evolutionary process, variants arise in individual development, rather than by genetic mutation,
and are inherited via social interaction rather than DNA. Good variants are culturally learned
(e.g., copied) by more agents, but, unlike intentional design, this need not be because the
teachers or the learners understand what makes them good.
In this opinion article, we suggest that an important kind of metacognition has been made fit
for purpose primarily by the latter two members of the team – intentional design and cultural
evolution – rather than genetic selection. Here, we focus on the role of cultural evolution. WeTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.02.007 1
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Glossary
Conscious: content that is globally
available – that is, represented in a
system and format so that it can be
used, without further processing, by a
wide range of cognitive processes such
as planning, verbal report and storage in
episodic memory.
Cultural learning: when a trait T (or a
close variant) is acquired by learning
from others who have T. Cultural
learning typically involves language,
teaching, imitation, or mindreading; that
is, a process specialised for high fidelity
transfer of information.
Cultural selection: increase in
frequency of a trait that is transmitted by
cultural learning. The increase may be
because the trait is culturally transmitted
more often than alternatives
(transmission bias), or because the trait
helps individuals to survive or
reproduce.
Endophenotype: a genetically
transmitted cause of a collection of
behavioural traits. An endophenotype is
useful when it shows greater heritability
than the behavioural traits it typically
causes.
Explicit metacognition:
metacognition based on conscious
representations in working memory,
thus sensitive to interference by
concurrent cognitive load.
Gene-based selection: increase in
Trends in Cognitive Sciencessurvey evidence that explicit metacognition (Box 1) is social in origin, and we outline an
empirical programme that would allow the cultural origins hypothesis to be further developed
and tested. First, however, we outline the many functions of metacognition in individual and
group decision-making.
Metacognition Has Intrapersonal and Suprapersonal Functions
Explicit metacognition uses conscious representations in working memory to monitor or
evaluate – and often to control – cognitive states and processes. Explicit metacognition (here
metacognition, when not qualified) is sensitive to cognitive load, and is typically slow, deliberate,
and verbally reportable [8,9]. It yields feelings of knowing and confidence judgements, allowing us
to think and report ‘I’m sure’ and ‘I’m not so sure’ about our perceptions, memories, and deci-
sions. The adoption of frameworks inherited from psychophysics and signal detection theory
has made possible the objective measurement of metacognitive ability in laboratory tasks, by
assessing the bias and sensitivity of judgments of confidence in relation to task performance
[10]. Metacognitive representations allow information captured by specialised sensorimotor pro-
cesses to be accessed by other processes in the same agent and by the cognitive systems of
other agents – it has both intrapersonal and suprapersonal control functions [9].
Metacognition contributes to effective intrapersonal decision-making in a range of contexts. For
instance, it helps ensure the smooth operation of ongoing thought and behaviour, by helping
us recognise our errors [11], regulate deployment of executive functions [12,13], and detect
lapses of attention [14]. It also enables cognitive offloading – the use of physical actions such
as tilting the head, making notes, and finger counting – to alter the information processing require-
ments of a task to reduce cognitive demand [15,16]. In educational settings, metacognition reg-
ulates study time, and thereby enables children and adults to learn more from reading texts
[17–19], which in turnmay contribute to the development of general intelligence [20]. Accordingly,
failures of metacognition may lead to maladaptive decision-making: people who are overconfi-
dent of their knowledge about information security (a positive metacognitive bias) are morefrequency, due to natural selection, of a
trait that is inherited by transmission of
genes from parents to offspring.
Intentional design: the capacity for
designing items with the intention of
fulfilling a purpose. Extends to cognitive
strategies and hence their underlying
mechanisms.
Metacognition: representation or
evaluation of a cognitive state or
process.
Metacognitive bias: the difference
between reported confidence and
accuracy. A subject can show
metacognitive bias while demonstrating
good metacognitive sensitivity (e.g., if
they are systematically over- or
underconfident).
Metacognitive sensitivity: the extent
to which a subject’s confidence reports
differentiate between correct and
incorrect decisions – that is, the
correlation between confidence and
accuracy.
Mindreading: the ability to understand
the thoughts of others, and their feelings
and other mental states.
Box 1. Explicit Metacognition
In this article we are concerned with what we call explicit metacognition. A representation is explicit, in our sense, when it is
conscious and represented in working memory so that it can be used by processes of cognitive control. Thus, a hallmark
of explicit metacognition is that it is sensitive to concurrent processing load. Humans typically communicate explicit
metacognitive representations verbally. For example, we can tell others when we are uncertain about what we have seen.
However, we can also communicate nonverbally about our explicit metacognitive states; and it is an open question
whether language is necessary for an individual to have the capacity for explicit metacognition.
Metacognition also operates in implicit processes that are automatic and relatively insensitive to cognitive load. The
contrast between explicit and implicit metacognition can be seen in research on error monitoring in skilled typists [130].
Automatic monitoring processes make skilled typists fractionally slower on the next keystroke after they have made an
error. Explicit metacognition, by contrast, allows the typist to report that they have made an error. The factors that affect
implicit and explicit metacognition in these scenarios are experimentally dissociable.
Metacognition is sometimes assumed to require consciousness, but here we adopt the more liberal definition that does
not presuppose that metacognitive processes are conscious. So, a nonconscious representation or evaluation of a cog-
nitive state or process can count as metacognitive. Explicit metacognition does require consciousness but note that our
usage does not make explicit synonymous with conscious (which is another common usage). Our use is more restrictive.
It excludes automatic metacognitive processes that do not depend on working memory and are insensitive to cognitive
load, even if they involve conscious states like feelings of fluency.
We can further distinguish two ways in which a metacognitive assessment of a decision can be computed [48]. First-order
confidence is based wholly on the state or states used to take the decision itself. Second-order confidence is computed by
a separate system and considers further factors (see Figure 2 in main text). Explicit metacognition is typically the result of a
second-order computation.
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Second-order computation: a
computation of confidence in a decision
that is computed by a separate system
and considers factors beyond the
information used to take the decision
itself [48]. Explicit metacognition is
typically second order.
Trends in Cognitive Scienceslikely to take risks when using the internet [21], and people with weaker metacognitive
sensitivity are more likely to hold radical beliefs at both ends of the political spectrum [22,23].
Metacognition also plays a central role in suprapersonal decision-making [9,24,25]. It not only en-
ables individuals to monitor their own cognitive processes, but it also enables broadcast and
sharing of otherwise private mental states with others. Cognitive offloading often involves depos-
iting information with, or soliciting information from, other agents [15,26]. When people are mak-
ing perceptual decisions together, ‘two heads are better than one’ when each person
communicates accurate metacognitive representations about their judgements [27–30]. Jurors
use witness confidence and other metacognitive representations (e.g., calibration of confidence
relative to accuracy) in deciding whether to trust witness testimony [31]. When coordinating com-
plex actions in team sports, people use metacognitive representations to decide the contribution
of each team member [32,33].
The suprapersonal functions of metacognitionmake it plausible, from an engineering perspective,
that metacognition has been shaped by cultural selection. The benefits of enhanced
metacognitive skills accrue, not only to the owner of the skills, but also to other members of the
social group with whom they make decisions and coordinate action. Consequently, it is in the in-
terests of a person with enhanced metacognitive skills to teach those skills, deliberately or inad-
vertently, to others in their group, and there is reason to expectmore skilled individuals to bemore
effective teachers – a condition for cultural selection.
The Cultural Origins Hypothesis
In comparison to this focus on the functions of metacognition, there has been little enquiry about
its origins – about the design team that enables metacognition to fulfil its intra- and suprapersonal
roles. Researchers tend to assume that genetic evolution has played amajor part in makingmeta-
cognition fit for purpose [34,35] and/or to underline the importance of individual learning [36–40].
We have no doubt that genetic evolution has played a role, and, given the continuing develop-
ment of metacognition in late childhood and adolescence [13,20,41,42], that learning is crucial.
Indeed, recent studies of human infants suggest that they may have a core, genetically inherited
capacity for implicit metacognition [26,43], providing a platform for the slow development of ex-
plicit metacognition through learning and experience. However, by contrast with previous work
on metacognition, we suggest that a particular kind of learning – cultural learning – is of over-
riding importance.
Learning is cultural when one agent, a receiver, learns from another agent, a sender. In cultural
learning, by contrast with other kinds of social learning, what the receiver learns through social in-
teraction with the sender is similar to, and causally dependent on, what the sender knows [44].
Cultural learning often, but not always, involves teaching. The sender may intend to communicate
information to the receiver, or instead involuntarily leak information that is picked up by the re-
ceiver. If metacognition is acquired through cultural learning, it may be fit for purpose not because
of gene-based selection and intentional design, but also due to cultural selection – a selection
process operating on variants transmitted culturally over generations of learners.
Here, we survey evidence that metacognition is acquired through cultural learning. A stronger
claim would be that metacognition is made fit for purpose by cultural selection; acquired through
cultural learning and rendered adaptive by a process of natural selection acting on the culturally
learned variants. There is currently less evidence in support of the stronger claim, partly because
it has not yet been seriously investigated. However, there is evidence of adaptively relevant vari-
ation in metacognitive ability (i.e., in the relevant phenotype) across cultural groups and societies.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 3
Trends in Cognitive SciencesGiven the timescales involved, this is unlikely to be the result of gene-based selection. It is there-
fore plausible that cultural selection has been at work, selecting the adaptive variants in the
metacognitive abilities observed in different cultural groups.
Current models of metacognition suggest that a range of first-order monitoring signals need to be
re-represented by themetacognitive system in order to become available for the kind of intra- and
suprapersonal control functions highlighted above [9,45,46] (Figure 1). Many of these first-order
signals are encapsulated within the perception-action loop. For instance, if a reaching movement
is subtly deviated from its trajectory by an unseen force, the person will correct the deviation
without any explicit metacognitive awareness that this correction has been applied [47].
Metacognitive representations of performance are instead the result of second-order
computations with respect to the perception–action cycle. One useful perspective on the com-
putational problem facing metacognition is to treat it as analogous to regular perception albeit
with different inputs. Just as perception is engaged with building a model of the environment
from limited data, so metacognition needs to build a model of system performance using some
form of inference about various cues [48]. This is consistent with the popular inferential view of
how metamemory judgments are formed [49], and implies that first-order monitoring signals
need to be discriminated and interpreted by the metacognitive system.
In the following, we identify three components that comprise the capacity for metacognition
(Figure 1): (i) discrimination – distinguishing metacognitive feelings from one another, and from
feelings that do not arise from metacognitive computations; (ii) interpretation – working out the
significance of metacognitive representations, for example, whether ease of processing indicatesTrends in Cognitive Sciences
Figure 1. Various Signals Emerge into Consciousness and Are Available for Broadcast. Unconscious: broken blue
lines –monitoring signals encapsulated within the perception–action loop. Conscious: unbroken blue lines – somemonitoring
signals re-represented as explicit metacognition. Solid black lines – direct experiences re-represented in consciousness. We
must learn to distinguish and interpret the various signals that are re-represented in consciousness. Social interaction: we can
be helped by others in this endeavour through the ability to broadcast and discuss experiences.
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sharing metacognitive representations with other agents. As we introduce each of these compo-
nents, and in the section that follows, we survey evidence that their development depends on cul-
tural learning, and we identify opportunities to test this hypothesis further in future research.
Discrimination
Relevant inputs for metacognition must be distinguished from one another (e.g., stimulus visibility
versus decision confidence) and from interoceptive signals, including emotional states (e.g., low
confidence versus fear). It would bemaladaptive to share within the cognitive system, or broadcast
to other agents, feelings that reflect states of the body or the world as if they represent properties of
cognitive representations and processes. For instance, fear of a bear should not be mistaken for
uncertainty about whether one has seen a bear. However, exactly this kind of crosstalk can be ob-
served in laboratory experiments onmetacognition. For example, when people were briefly flashed
a face with a disgusted expression, their confidence in an incidental perceptual task was subtly
modulated [50]. In turn, blocking noradrenaline signalling using beta blockers (potentially blunting
these arousal signals) leads to an enhancement of metacognitive sensitivity [51].
Learning to discriminate metacognitive feelings from one another and from other feelings may be
analogous to learning to distinguish pairs of visual [52] or olfactory [53] stimuli that were, at first,
subjectively identical. Other agents who have already learned the discrimination can facilitate
the process by creating environments in which different inputs are given different outcomes
(e.g., rewards and punishments) or different verbal descriptions [54,55]. For example, sports
coaches tell athletes that they are ‘keyed up’ or excited (high arousal) rather than unprepared
(low confidence). Some children’s games give different labels to metacognitive and non-
metacognitive feelings and further enhance discrimination by arranging for the child to experience
no correlation or a negative correlation between them. For example, ‘peek-a-boo’ gives children
alternating experiences of certainty and uncertainty – perceptual confidence is high when the
adult’s face is visible and low when it is covered. These experiences are given different labels
(‘Now you see me’, ‘Now you don’t’) and, crucially, feelings of surprise, resulting from both ap-
pearance and disappearance of the face, are not confounded with feelings of certainty.
Interpretation
There is growing evidence from laboratory studies that agents learn the significance of metacognitive
representations. The cultural origins hypothesis draws attention to the fact that these studies provide
evidence of cultural learning. Experimenters send information to participant receivers about the signif-
icance of metacognitive feelings by structuring participants’ experience (e.g., making true statements
difficult to process by reducing text/background contrast), and through verbal instruction (e.g., telling
participants that true statements are often difficult to process) [56–60].
Under many conditions, ease of processing a stimulus, an object or a sentence, is interpreted as
indicating that the stimulus is familiar, true or attractive [61,62]. It can often be hard to discount mis-
leading influences of fluency on our metacognitive judgments. For instance, in experiments on eye-
witnessmemory [63], participants were asked to remember a list of faces and afterwards to indicate
whether a face was previously on the list or novel, together with their confidence in this decision.
Critically, half of the photographs were presented as dimly lit in the test phase, whereas half were
presented as brightly lit. Increasing the brightness of the face (and, presumably, processing fluency)
at test decreased accuracy in identification, but increased subjects’ confidence in their answers.
These results raise the possibility that we genetically inherit a tendency to regard feelings of flu-
ency as positive. However, when participants experience an environment in which novel stimuliTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 5
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cessing as a sign that they have not seen a stimulus before [64]. Similarly, when participants are
exposed to false propositions that are easy to process and true propositions that are difficult to
process, they begin to interpret ease of processing as a sign of falsity [65] (Figure 2). Learning
through instruction and feedback can even modulate the degree to which different components –
response conflict, speed, and repetition – contribute to feelings of fluency [57]. More generally,
instructions (such as ‘When it’s easy, it’s often wrong’) may change interpretation of
metacognitive feelings directly, or indirectly by altering priors in subsequent feedback-based
reinforcement learning (Figure 2) [57,66,67]. As an example of how instruction-based priors
can shape metacognitive signals (even in the absence of explicit feedback), people told that
they were clever or stupid before a working memory task showed different error-related brain
responses during task performance [67].
The laboratory evidence that agents learn the significance of metacognitive representations has
led to speculation about the natural environments that would support such learning [36].Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Figure 2. Instructions Can Change the Operation of First-Order Processes. Through the operation of second-order processes a model of decision-making at the
first-order level is available for broadcasting at the second-order level. The pupil broadcasts that they believe that ‘when perception is easy, the statement is true’ (see [65]).
The teacher broadcasts that the pupil’s first-order decision-making system is wrong.
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occur in social settings. We should expect to find learning about the context-specific significance
of metacognitive representations in playgrounds, classrooms, training exercises and informal ex-
changes among coworkers. For example, children doing rigorous multiple-choice tests of verbal
comprehension are taught that if there is an obvious answer and the question seems easy, then
they should go back and read the question more carefully because they might have fallen for a
lure [68]. Conversely, the overanxious person who always questions their job performance is
offered strategies to discount their feelings of low confidence [69].
Broadcasting
Broadcasting metacognitive representations to other agents for suprapersonal control involves
verbal and nonverbal communication. For nonverbal communication, people automatically pro-
duce signals such as postures, action kinematics, gestures, facial expressions, and vocal quali-
ties that convey confidence [70,71]. For example, in many English-speaking subcultures,
upright posture, a serious facial expression, and vocal depth communicate assurance. These sig-
nals are in turn interpreted automatically in light of how people themselves produce these signals
(e.g., two people with different speeds of movement will interpret the same action to imply differ-
ent levels of confidence) [70,72]. This result indicates that receivers can derive information about
senders’ confidence from nonverbal as well as verbal cues – a basic requirement for cultural
learning of metacognition. Typically, nonverbal signals of confidence are not only produced but
also learned without deliberation, via automatic imitation [73]. However, some institutions –
such as drama schools, social skill training programmes, and debating societies at fee-paying
schools – directly teach people how to act confidently. There may also be intermediate cases
in which specific tools support the expression of confidence – for instance, allowing 3-year-old
children to use picture-based confidence scales to indicate their confidence in perceptual deci-
sions is sufficient for them to display above-chance metacognitive sensitivity [74].
For verbal communication, people use words that directly map onto confidence (e.g., ‘I’m sure’,
‘I think I saw it’ or ‘I dimly remember’) [27–29] as well as signals that convey confidence nonver-
bally but in a controlled way (e.g., raising a hand swiftly or indicating how confident one feels on a
scale from 1 to 10) [30,75]. People must solve an intricate mapping problem in order for this kind
of overt communication to be effective [30,76]. In technical terms, people must map their private
feelings of confidence onto public expressions of confidence in a mutually consistent manner:
they must agree on not only the rank order of different expressions (e.g., that 'certain' implies
higher confidence than 'sure') but also their statistical meaning (e.g., that 'sure' means that the
probability that I am correct is 85% and not 75%). Laboratory studies which required groups of
people to make joint decisions about ambiguous stimuli have shown that people quickly develop
a common language for communicating and interpreting confidence – with better coordination
leading to higher group accuracy [28,30]. More broadly, it is striking that people from the same
cultural group, while not agreeing on the exact statistical meaning of different expressions of
confidence, generally agree on their rank order [77].
The proposal that cultural learning shapes the gestures andwords used for interpersonal broadcast-
ing of metacognitive representations is, in many ways, the least surprising component of the cultural
origins hypothesis. On reflection, few would doubt that, like other communicative conventions, we
learn how to express confidence from other members of our social groups. However, here we high-
light broadcasting in addition to discrimination and interpretation because the importance of com-
municative conventions is often overlooked in research on metacognition. For example, reports
that women are less confident than men [78], and that finance professionals are more confident
than average members of the population [79], are typically assumed to indicate gender andTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 7
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ences in communicative conventions. It is, nevertheless, possible that communicative conventions
for sharing metacognitive representations affect the representations themselves. For instance,
there is evidence that the linguistic coding of colour [80] and space [81] can affect perception.
One avenue for future research would be to test whether linguistic variation in epistemic modality
(e.g., presence or absence of evidential markers [82]) affects the development of metacognition or
metacognitive performance.
Evidence of Cultural Learning
Further support for the cultural origins hypothesis, and directions for future research, comes from
research on development and education, training, cultural variation, individual differences, and
metacognition in non-human animals.
Development and Education
Cultural influences onmindreading provide an analogue of the kind of developmental learning that
we might also expect for metacognition. For instance, naturalistic studies have shown that indi-
vidual differences [83,84] and crosscultural variation [85] in the development of mindreading
covary with how much, and in what ways, mothers talk to their children about mental states.
The cultural origins hypothesis predicts a similar relationship between the development
of metacognition and parents’ references to confidence (e.g., ‘Do you think you can do that?’,
'Are you sure?', 'You’ve got it!’) during joint tasks (e.g., stacking bricks). This feedback would en-
able the infant to appropriately discriminate initially undifferentiated metacognitive experiences.
Compelling evidence of cultural learning in development also comes from intervention studies with
schoolchildren in the USA and Europe. These show that metacognitive training – for example,
teachers instructing pupils on goal-setting, self-questioning, and how to interpret processing
dysfluency – improves text-based andmathematical learning [17,86,87] by improvingmetacognitive
sensitivity [88] and self-reported metacognitive knowledge [17]. There is also preliminary evidence
that effective teachers of literacy involuntarily leak metacognitive information that is picked up by
pupils. For example, teachers’ spontaneous use of language promoting self-monitoring predicts
pupils’ metacognitive awareness and independent use of reading strategies [89].
Training
Training experiments with children and adults complement naturalistic studies in home
and school settings. Previous research has shown that instruction and exposure to new
contingencies can make people reinterpret feelings of fluency as signs that stimuli are unfamiliar
or unattractive, and that propositions are untrue [56–60] (see earlier). This evidence of reversal
learning could be extended by testing the durability and context-specificity of the reversal effects;
establishing whether they extend to other metacognitive feelings, such as ‘urge-to-err’ [90]; and
comparing the power of overt and covert social inputs to learning – that is, feedback given by
another visible agent or arranged by the experimenter behind the scenes.
The cultural origins hypothesis proposes that metacognition has been a target of cultural selection,
implying that people learn from others to perform psychological operations (e.g., to discriminate
metacognitive feelings), not merely to perform specific overt behaviours (e.g., to play peek-a-boo
with their children). This is supported by evidence that children who have been taught an inferential
skill by an adult do not replicate the adult’s teaching behaviour (e.g., use of eye contact and
gestures) when they teach the skill to others [91], and by evidence that metacognitive training gen-
eralises across task domains. Carpenter and colleagues [37] showed that social feedback on con-
fidence judgements in a perceptual task improvesmetacognitive calibration in both perceptual and8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
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tings where different overt behaviours are required. Such transfer effects may in turn be mediated
by the existence of domain-general metacognitive resources [92–95]. This training-and-transfer
procedure could be adapted to test the cultural selection hypothesis more directly by asking peo-
ple given metacognitive training on a perceptual task to collaborate with naïve participants
performing a memory task [25]. If this collaboration enhanced the metacognitive sensitivity of the
naïve participants, the second generation, it would provide yet stronger evidence that
metacognitive operations rather than overt behaviours are culturally learned.
Further evidence of cultural training of metacognition comes from research in the humanities,
social sciences and natural sciences showing that Buddhist practices are designed to, and are
effective in, promoting metacognitive sensitivity (Box 2).
Cultural Variation
There is marked cultural variation both in metacognitive bias [96] and kinds of selective social
learning that may depend on metacognition [25,97,98]. For example, students from western,
individualistic cultures (USA, Australia, and New Zealand) express more confidence in their deci-
sions than students from East Asian, group-oriented cultures (Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan)
[99], and brain imaging suggests this variation is not due solely to norms regulating the
expression of confidence. The medial prefrontal cortex, a focal area for metacognition [100],
is more strongly activated during self-assessment tasks in westerners than in people from
less-individualistic cultures [101,102], and self-referential thoughts differentially activate hubs
of the resting-state network in relation to individualistic versus collectivistic traits [103]. To our
knowledge, there is no comparable research on cultural variation in metacognitive sensitivity.
However, given the evidence of cultural variation in metacognitive bias, and the substantial
individual variation in metacognitive sensitivity that is found within cultures [104,105], we would
also expect there to be variation in metacognitive sensitivity across cultures. Crosscultural studiesBox 2. Meditation and Metacognition
Practices that promote cultural learning of metacognition are common in many traditions, including Christian and Judaic,
but they are especially prominent in Buddhism, where they have been culturally evolving for more than 2500 years.
Mindfulness (sati in Pali, smrti in Sanskrit) is central to Buddhist practice and has been closely associated with metacog-
nition by scholars of Buddhism [131] and by western psychologists [132]. Contrary to the emphasis of many who have
brought mindfulness practice to western audiences for the treatment of stress and depression, mindfulness is not neces-
sarily nonjudgemental. Rather, in the Buddhist tradition, it involves the kind of evaluation, monitoring and control of cogni-
tive activities characteristic of explicit metacognition [131]:
‘When mindfulness arises, sire, it reminds one of the states together with their counterparts that are wholesome and unwhole-
some, blameable and blameless . . . Thus, sire, mindfulness has reminding as its characteristic. . . . When mindfulness arises,
sire, it examines the courses of the beneficial and unbeneficial states thus: ‘These states are beneficial; these states are
unbeneficial; these states are helpful; these states are unhelpful.’ Then the one who practises yoga removes the unbeneficial
states and takes hold of the beneficial states . . . Thus, sire, mindfulness has taking hold as its characteristic.
[Milindapañha, 37-8]’
Experimental evidence that mindfulness-based meditation improves metacognitive sensitivity comes from both expertise
and training studies. People who have chosen to practice mindfulness show greater metacognitive sensitivity in a tactile
perception task than nonmeditators, and number of hours of practice (1–15 000) predict metacognitive sensitivity [133].
Similarly, long-term practitioners of mindfulness meditation are quicker than nonmediators to detect their own intention
to move [134,135]. In a training study where participants were randomly chosen to receive training in mindfulness medi-
tation or advice on nutrition, the meditation group subsequently showed greater metacognitive sensitivity in a recognition
memory task [136]. Studies comparing the effects of training in different meditation practices suggest that, with an ex-
tended training period, practices designed to promote metacognition (thought-observing mindfulness), are more effective
than other practices (body-focussed mindfulness) in enhancing metacognition [38,137].
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Trends in Cognitive Sciencesdirectly testing this prediction of the cultural origins hypothesis, by carefully quantifying and
separating metacognitive bias and sensitivity, are a priority for future research.
Individual Differences
While twin studies have indicated a genetic component in the development of metacognitive bias
[106], metacognitive sensitivity is yet to be investigated using the twin method. Guided by the cul-
tural origins hypothesis, research on individual differences in metacognitive sensitivity would in-
clude twin studies assessing the magnitude of any genetic contribution and whether it
depends on a social-cognitive endophenotype. For example, children who are genetically
predisposed to attend more closely to other agents may be better able to acquire metacognitive
skill through cultural learning.
More broadly, the cultural origins hypothesis calls for research relating individual differences in
metacognitive sensitivity to social skills, social experience, and education. Emulating a recent
study relating metacognition to mental health [107], one approach would be to correlate
metacognitive sensitivity with social and demographic indices in a large-scale online study of a
general population sample. This approach would be complemented by laboratory tests. For ex-
ample, if metacognitive skill is acquired by cultural learning, one would expect individual differ-
ences in imitation and mindreading [108], which are important in cultural learning, to predict
individual differences in metacognitive sensitivity [109–111]. More specifically, the cultural origins
hypothesis makes a critical prediction: if metacognition has been a target of cultural selection, one
would expect people with greater metacognitive sensitivity to be more effective teachers of
metacognitive skills. For example, if I collaborate with someone who has high metacognitive sen-
sitivity, in a task where confidence estimates are exchanged [27], my own sensitivity should in-
crease more than if my collaborator has low metacognitive sensitivity.
Non-human Animals
Given that non-human animals lack language and other cognitive resources involved in cultural
learning, such as mindreading [112] and teaching [113], the cultural origins hypothesis is consis-
tent with analyses suggesting that simple associative learning mechanisms (e.g., model-free re-
inforcement learning [114]) is sufficient to explain the metacognitive achievements of animals
[115,116]. It is, however, notoriously difficult to assess from behavioural data alone whether
metacognition in non-human animals is the product of explicit processes, or whether it might
be accommodated by implicit (or first-order) computations [117]. The finding that metacognitive
sensitivity can be manipulated independently of performance by prefrontal inactivation in rodents
andmonkeys suggests that some form of second-order computation could be in play [118,119] –
but such computations may be automatic and learnt using model-free reinforcement learning.
However, if the cultural origins hypothesis for metacognition is correct, we would expect a
much closer correspondence between the social and metacognitive abilities of humans than in
analogues of the same abilities measured in non-human animals.
In this section we have surveyed evidence that, in humans, metacognition is shaped by a specific
kind of social learning – cultural learning. Social interaction provides more than motivation for the
development of metacognitive skills, and information about the circumstances in which they
should be used [43,120,121]. It also transmits specific metacognitive skills from experts to
novices, creating the conditions necessary for cultural selection. At present, the most compelling
evidence comes from research on development, education and training. Previous research on
cultural variation, individual differences, and non-human animals is also consistent with cultural
learning, and we have suggested strategies for further testing the cultural origins hypothesis in
each of these areas of study.10 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx
Outstanding Questions
What is the nature and extent of
cultural variation in metacognitive
sensitivity? Is there cultural variation in
the way confidence and error signals
are computed from first order cues?
Towhat degree ismetacognitive sensitivity
genetically heritable? Is this underwritten
by a social–cognitive endophenotype,
such as social attention?
Are people with high metacognitive
sensitivity better teachers of metacognition
than people with lower metacognitive
sensitivity?
What kindsof gamesand routines support
the development of metacognition?
Do games and conversation have
differential effects? For example,
are games especially effective
in promoting discrimination, while
conversation enhances interpretation
and broadcasting?
What kind of experience or training
would improve metacognitive sensitivity
in adulthood? Does this kind of training
enhance the quality of group decision-
making?
Trends in Cognitive SciencesConcluding Remarks
We have suggested that cultural learning enables human agents to discriminate, interpret, and
broadcast metacognitive representations. It is possible that cultural learning also plays a yet
deeper role in makingmetacognition fit for purpose. It may bring together decision and evaluation
processes to create an architecture capable of assessing the rightness of cognitive representa-
tions [48]. Alternatively, cultural learning might enable such an architecture – already developed
for mindreading [109,122–124] or in parallel with mindreading [125] – to process new kinds of
input; signals from inside rather than outside the thinker, which bear on the reliability and validity
of the thinker’s cognitive processes [126]. We have not pursued these possibilities because, at
present, there is no empirical evidence bearing on them directly. By contrast, we have argued
that education and training studies already show that cultural learning supports discrimination,
interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations, and that our cultural
origins hypothesis could be tested further through a programme of research in psychology and
cognitive neuroscience examining development, individual differences and cultural variation in
metacognitive sensitivity (see Outstanding Questions).
Metacognition is important in education, mental health, and public life. It improves learning
in schools [86–89,127]; regulates anxiety, depression, and compulsion [107]; promotes
effective leadership [128,129]; and encourages moderation in political and religious debate
[22]. Metacognition is an essential ingredient not only of our capacity to know ourselves, but to
know ourselves together; to make decisions in groups that are better informed, fairer,
and more reasonable than the decisions that each of us can make alone. The cultural origins
hypothesis suggests that the intrapersonal and suprapersonal functions of metacognition are
made possible primarily by cultural learning and are adaptive in part due to cultural selection.
Metacognition is tuned for social interaction by social interaction.
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